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Rethinking Strategies for Prosecution 
of Domestic Violence in the Wake of 
Crawford 
Laurence Busching† 
The police receive a 911 call for assistance.  The caller 
tells the operator that her neighbors are having a terrible fight.  
To the caller, it sounds like someone is breaking things and a 
very angry man is beating a woman.  The caller refuses to 
identify himself, saying this happens all the time and he does 
not want to get involved. 
The police respond to the apartment within minutes.  
They find an irate man and a distraught woman.  The woman 
is injured and exclaims, “He hit me in the eye.  Now I can 
barely see out of it.”  The man is arrested and the woman is 
taken to the hospital. 
This scenario, or one close to it, occurs thousands of 
times a day across the country.  Domestic violence is an 
epidemic that costs hundreds of lives, injures millions, and 
leaves many more traumatized each year.1  This essay will 
discuss the strategies used to prosecute batterers, and the 
impact that Crawford v. Washington2 may have on those 
strategies. 
  
 † Laurence Busching is Chief of the Family Court Division of the New York 
City Law Department and Adjunct Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School.  He is 
former Chief of the Family Violence and Child Abuse Bureau of the New York County 
District Attorney’s Office.  Mr. Busching wishes to thank New York County Assistant 
District Attorney Andrew Seewald and New York City Law Department Summer 
Honors Intern Jason Friedman for their assistance. 
 1 Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: 
Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 3, 3 (1999).  See also U.S. Department of Justice, Family Violence Statistics 
(2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/fvs.txt (3.5 million violent crimes 
committed against family members from 1998-2002; 49% against spouses, 11% against 
sons and daughters, 41% against other family members). 
 2 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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BEFORE CRAWFORD 
For many years, prosecutors and the courts sat on the 
sidelines of the battles occurring within our nation’s homes.  
Driven by opinions that domestic violence was a private matter 
and that victims would “drop the charges,” prosecutors and 
courts routinely dismissed the vast majority of cases, allowing 
domestic violence to continue unchecked.3 
At the urging of many victims’ advocates, women’s 
rights organizations, and others, Congress passed the Violence 
Against Women Act in 1994.4  The Act invested vast resources, 
on a local level, to promote “pro-arrest” policies and effective 
court interventions.  Police were encouraged to make arrests 
whenever probable cause existed, regardless of victims’ wishes.  
Prosecutors were thus confronted with large numbers of cases 
with uncooperative victims and were nevertheless expected to 
obtain convictions.5 
Relying primarily on victim testimony proved extremely 
problematic.  A large percentage of victims either did not call 
the police or did so simply to stop the violence.  Most did not 
want to have the perpetrator arrested and did not want to 
participate in the criminal justice system.  They feared the 
negative consequences that might result from a conviction of 
the perpetrator, including loss of income, homelessness, and 
change of immigration status.6  Many  felt guilty about their 
own behavior and feared depriving their children of a father.  
  
 3 See Mary P. Koss, Blame, Shame, and Community: Justice Response to 
Violence Against Women, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1332, 1334 (2000) (citing D.J. 
Rebovich, Prosecution Response to Domestic Violence:  Results of a Survey of Large 
Jurisdictions, in LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE 59-61 (American Bar 
Association & U.S. Department of Justice eds., 1998) (finding that a third of American 
jurisdictions report that more than half of victims of domestic violence refuse to 
participate in the prosecution of their abusers)). 
 4 Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). 
 5 Donna D. Bloom, “Utter Excitement” About Nothing: Why Domestic 
Violence Evidence-Based Prosecution Will Survive Crawford v. Washington, 36 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 717, 727-28 (2005). 
 6 People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (Crim. Ct. 2004) (“Prosecutors like 
to point out that some complainants in domestic assault cases are unwilling to testify 
at trial because they fear the defendant, because they are economically or emotionally 
dependent upon the defendant, or because they are reluctant to break up their own 
families.”).  For more information on domestic violence within an immigrant 
community, see Nimish R. Ganatra, The Cultural Dynamic in Domestic Violence: 
Understanding the Additional Burdens Battered Immigrant Women of Color Face in the 
United States, 2 J.L. SOC’Y 109, 110 (2001) (detailing the many barriers that immigrant 
women of color face in pursuing prosecution of their abusers, including “such factors as 
language and cultural differences, racial discrimination, and immigration laws”). 
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And, of course, the offender was someone they once, and 
possibly still, loved.  As a result, many, if not most, victims 
refused to testify, sign affidavits, or otherwise cooperate with 
the prosecution of their abusers.7 
In addition, even if the victim were initially cooperative, 
strong incentives existed for batterers and their families to 
convince her not to testify.  Through charm, threats, appeals to 
sympathy or a combination of all of these, batterers were 
highly successful in preventing the goals of the criminal justice 
system from being achieved.  Worse still, the most brutal and 
manipulative batterers were the least likely to be convicted in a 
system based on victim cooperation. 
Police and prosecutors saw the system fail time and 
again.  Based on what police had seen and heard when first 
responding to the scene of a domestic violence incident, police 
and prosecutors felt certain that a high percentage of those 
arrested were, in fact, guilty of committing an act of domestic 
violence.  Yet many were allowed to escape justice and 
potentially, given the cyclical nature of domestic violence,8 
cause yet more harm, sometimes even killing their victims. 
Ironically, in those instances where batterers did kill 
their victims, cases were actually easier to prove.  Such cases 
were no longer thought to be private matters, victim 
cooperation was neither expected nor required, and police and 
prosecutors aggressively sought alternative sources of evidence. 
This made little sense.  Why should police and 
prosecutors wait until victims were dead before taking steps to 
hold batterers accountable for their actions?  Would not 
resources and efforts be better spent trying to protect victims 
while they were still alive? 
With these questions in mind, police and prosecutors 
began focusing on building cases that would hold up even if 
victims were not cooperative.  Using many of the methods and 
techniques employed in prosecuting domestic violence 
homicides, prosecutors focused on building evidence-based 
prosecutions.9 
  
 7 Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence 
and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 367-69 
(1996). 
 8 Mark Hansen, New Strategy in Battering Cases, 81 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 
14 (“[D]omestic violence usually follows a cyclical pattern that progressively gets 
worse.”). 
 9 Id. 
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This strategy involved relying on out-of-court 
statements of victims and witnesses.  Since many of these cases 
appeared to be clear-cut to the police officers responding to the 
scenes and to the prosecutors handling the cases, the strategy 
focused on allowing judges and juries to review the same 
evidence relied upon by law enforcement officials in deciding to 
prosecute. 
In the hypothetical case described at the beginning of 
this essay, the prosecutor would seek to introduce both the 
statements of the neighbor (“It sounds like someone is breaking 
things and a very angry man is beating a woman.”) and the 
victim (“He hit me in the eye.  Now I can barely see out of it.”).  
Admission of this evidence would be sought regardless of 
whether the witness or victim was actually going to testify and 
be subject to cross-examination. 
The prosecution would argue that the statement of the 
neighbor to the 911 operator should be admissible under the 
present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, since it 
was a statement describing or explaining an event made while 
the declarant was perceiving it, or immediately thereafter.10  
Evidence of this nature has become widely available due to the 
widespread practice of recording 911 calls.11  The callers are 
usually victims or witnesses reporting events as they unfold 
and urgently requesting police assistance.  These out-of-court 
statements have proved to be compelling evidence in many 
instances.  For example, what fact-finder would not be moved 
to hear the tape of a terrified young woman calling 911 to ask 
the police to protect her and her younger sister from her 
violent, gun-wielding boyfriend?12 
Similarly, the prosecution would argue that the 
statement of the victim to the police should be admissible 
under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, since 
it was a statement made contemporaneously or immediately 
after a startling event and asserting the circumstances of that 
event as observed by the declarant.13  Many courts have 
allowed the admission of statements made to first responders 
  
 10 RICHARD T. FARRELL, PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 8-603 (11th ed. 
1995); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 11 People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 729, 731 (1993) (adopting the present sense 
impression exception). 
 12 State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. 2004) (defendant convicted; tape of 
911 call from victim admitted to evidence as non-testimonial under Crawford). 
 13 FARRELL, supra note 10, § 8-604; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
2005] STRATEGIES FOR PROSECUTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 395 
such as police officers.  Police officers hear these types of 
statements every day and they use them to evaluate a variety 
of situations.  They arrive at the scene within minutes of the 
event.  They see someone who is extremely upset and often 
injured.  They have the opportunity to evaluate the demeanor 
of the declarant and determine whether he or she would have 
had sufficient time and opportunity to fabricate a story. 
After the O.J. Simpson case, states passed legislation 
permitting the admission of statements by alleged victims to 
law enforcement personnel or medical providers as to the 
identity and actions of the perpetrator of an act of domestic 
violence regardless of whether they were present sense 
impressions or excited utterances.14 This further allowed 
prosecutors to try cases without relying on victims to testify at 
trial. 
This strategy proved highly successful in obtaining 
convictions.  Many more guilty verdicts were delivered after 
trials.  In fact, in some jurisdictions, the conviction rate for 
trials where the victim did not testify was higher than those 
where the victim did.  These convictions also helped to convince 
many other batterers to plead guilty.15 
In the view of many prosecutors and victim advocates, 
these strategies helped keep victims safe.16  Replacing a system 
dependent on victim cooperation with one based on evidence 
from a broader range of sources reduced incentives for 
batterers to try to influence victim cooperation and testimony.  
  
 14 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 2005).  For information on 
the motivation of the legislature, see Evidence Law – Hearsay Rule – California Adopts 
Hearsay Exception Making Written Statements by Unavailable Witnesses That Describe 
Past Physical Abuse Admissible in Civil and Criminal Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 805, 
805 (1997).  
 15 See Luisa Bigornia, Alternatives to Traditional Criminal Prosecution of 
Spousal Abuse, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 57, 58 (2001). 
The success of aggressive prosecution generally in San Diego is indicated by a 
decrease of nearly 70 percent in domestic homicides since 1985, and in an 
increase in the spousal-abuse docket load from 20 cases in 1986 to 1,500 cases 
in 1996.  In 1995, 33 percent of misdemeanor cases against batterers went to 
trial without a witness.  The victim testified for the defense in 19 percent of 
the cases, and recanted favorable information initially given to the 
prosecution in 15 percent of the cases. 
Id. 
 16 Celeste E. Byrom, The Use of the Excited Utterance Hearsay Exception in 
the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases After Crawford v. Washington, 24 REV. 
LITIG. 409, 412 (2005) (“The criminal justice system can assist in stopping the violence, 
making victims safer, and holding abusers accountable by pursuing domestic violence 
cases with or without victim participation.” (quoting San Diego District City Attorney 
Casey Gwinn)). 
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It also helped shift batterers’ focus from victim-blaming to 
system-blaming.  This was especially noted when victims would 
come to court specifically to testify on behalf of their batterers 
in order to rebut the proof presented in an evidence-based 
prosecution.  In fact, some jurisdictions found the highest 
conviction rate of all pertained to those cases where the victim 
testified on her batterer’s behalf.17  Increasing the number of 
batterers held accountable was widely viewed as important in 
removing dangerous batterers from society, promoting 
deterrence, and showing victims that the system would help to 
protect them even if powerful forces were working against 
them. 
THE IMPACT OF CRAWFORD 
With the Supreme Court’s announcement of Crawford, 
commentators and defense attorneys foresaw the demise of this 
strategy.18  Because Crawford characterized cross-examination 
as a “bedrock procedural guarantee,”19 lawyers expected that 
out-of-court statements previously admitted would now be 
excluded.  A practice viewed by many defense attorneys as 
prosecutorial over-reach would be stopped in its tracks. 
This has not happened to the extent many had 
predicted.20  Crawford’s prohibition is against “testimonial” 
statements, such as depositions or responses to formal 
interrogations.  Present sense impressions and excited 
utterances admitted in typical domestic violence cases lack the 
formality and self-awareness on the part of the declarants that 
  
 17 Bigornia, supra note 15, at 59. 
[P]rosecution may be more successful without the victim.  Because the jury 
tends to have a mental stereotype of a domestic violence victim, the victim 
may be considered less credible if she does not fit the stereotype.  
Furthermore, if the victim who has recanted is called as a defense witness, 
the prosecutor can impeach using the victim’s spontaneous statements to 
police officers and detectives, 911 statements, and the victim’s answers to 
standard questionnaires. 
Id. 
 18 Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers after Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 
752 n.27 (2005) (referring to Phil Studenberg, Midlife America’s Midlife Crisis, OR. 
DEF. ATT’Y, Apr.-May 2004, at 2; David Feige, Domestic Silence: The Supreme Court 
Kills Evidence-Based Prosecution, SLATE, Mar. 12, 2004, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2097041). 
 19 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). 
 20 See Lininger, supra note 18, at 768-82 (discussing the avenues of 
prosecution post-Crawford); see also Bloom, supra note 5, at 748-52; Byrom, supra note 
16, at 423-28 (discussing whether Crawford effectively ends the excited utterance 
exception). 
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the Crawford court was concerned about.21  In fact, rules of 
evidence allow for the admissibility of such statements 
specifically because they are made prior to any opportunity to 
fabricate.  Logic dictates that declarants would not have given 
thought to potential in-court uses of the statements.  In post-
Crawford decisions, courts have often referred to statements 
made to 911 operators and responding police officers as cries 
for help rather than as formal accusatorial statements.22 
Of course, not all of the evidence-based strategy 
survived Crawford.  Many broad-based hearsay exceptions 
created by state legislatures to admit a wider range of 
statements to law enforcement personnel and medical 
providers fell on Crawford grounds.23  In jurisdictions where 
such provisions have been struck down, prosecutors have 
experienced a significant drop in their conviction rates.24 
The self-examination that has taken place in the 
aftermath of Crawford may, in fact, prompt the 
implementation of even more aggressive prosecutorial 
strategies with regard to domestic violence cases.  Many police 
agencies and prosecutors’ offices have given increased attention 
to recovery of physical evidence and memorialization of 
injuries.  Police may begin reading arrestees their Miranda 
warnings and taking statements, as is often done with 
homicide and other felonies.  In the experience of many 
prosecutors, a thorough interview of a suspected batterer can 
often lead to as much useful evidence as a 911 call, excited 
utterance, or even a victim’s testimony. 
Additionally, Crawford explicitly maintained the status 
quo regarding forfeiture of the right of confrontation.25  This is 
  
 21 See People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879-80 (Crim. Ct. 2004) 
(addressing the issue of the admissibility of a 911 call made by a domestic violence 
victim). 
 22 Id. at 880.  Some courts distinguish between different circumstances 
occurring during the 911 call.  See, e.g., People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 406-07 
(Sup. Ct. 2004) (determining the questioning during an anonymous 911 call to be akin 
to police interrogation proscribed under Crawford). 
 23 People v. Adams, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 237, 238 (Ct. App. 2004) (reversing 
defendant’s conviction and finding that the trial court violated his constitutional rights 
by admitting the out-of-court statements of the victim under CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 in 
lieu of her trial testimony); see also People v. Kilday, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 161, 163 (Ct. App. 
2004). 
 24 Lininger, supra note 18, at 820 (providing a detailed survey in Appendix 1 
of the effects of Crawford on prosecutions in California and Oregon). 
 25 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 n.10 (2004) (stating that “[O]ur 
refusal to articulate a comprehensive definition in this case will cause interim 
uncertainty.  But it can hardly be any worse than the status quo.”). 
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especially important in domestic violence cases.  As police and 
prosecutors continue pursuing prosecution in the face of victim 
non-cooperation, they find that they often have very effective 
evidence in prior statements, depositions and grand jury 
testimony.  For example, prosecutors are reluctant when 
seeking an indictment to allow compelling grand jury 
testimony to go to waste at trial because the victim has ceased 
to participate in the proceedings.  In response, domestic 
violence prosecutors have begun drawing some lessons from 
their colleagues who prosecute organized crime.  Just as “crime 
families” have mechanisms in place to punish disloyalty and 
enforce a code of silence, so have many families in which 
domestic violence takes place.  It was decided to draw on these 
parallels to have prior testimony and other statements of 
coerced and intimidated victims admitted into evidence under a 
Mastrangelo26 or a Sirois27 theory that the defendant has 
forfeited the right of confrontation.  For example, prosecutors 
bringing motions to admit prior statements and testimony can 
often present a history of domestic violence through statements 
by police witnesses, family members, friends, victim advocates 
and medical providers.  They can then demonstrate through 
telephone records, recorded voice-mail and other messages, and 
testimony of other witnesses that the batterer has been 
communicating with the victim, often in violation of an order of 
protection, in order to ensure that she not cooperate with 
prosecutors.28  With Crawford casting some doubt on the 
admissibility of some types of out-of-court statements, there is 
likely to be an increase in the number of requests for 
Mastrangelo hearings. 
Crawford may also prompt prosecutors to re-examine 
the strategy of compelling victims to testify.  In response to the 
fear that some formerly admissible statements may now be 
inadmissible, prosecutors may feel forced to compel victims’ 
appearances, through subpoenas or material witness orders, to 
  
 26 U.S. v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[I]f [the] witness’ 
silence [was] procured by defendant himself, whether by chicanery, by threats, or by 
actual violence or murder, defendant [could] not . . . assert his confrontation clause 
rights in order to prevent prior grand jury testimony of that witness from being 
admitted against him.” (citations omitted)). 
 27 Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 460 N.Y.S.2d 591, 597-98 (App. Div. 1983) 
(offering guidelines for future cases involving issues of witness tampering by 
defendants).  Sirois was the original defendant in this case, although the action was 
brought by the district attorney seeking a writ of mandamus. 
 28 See, e.g., People v. Santiago, No. 2725-02, 2003 WL 21507176, at *13 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 7, 2003). 
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avoid dismissal.  This situation could potentially create great 
risk to victims and inadvertently promote the incidence of 
perjurious testimony.  Unfortunately, prosecutors may feel this 
is sometimes the only way to protect a victim where the 
defendant’s release would put her safety at risk. 
To protect against the risk of unexpected recantations 
by frightened witnesses, policy-makers and legislators should 
consider changing evidentiary rules to permit more effective 
cross-examination.  Some jurisdictions have very restrictive 
statutes limiting a party’s ability to impeach its own witnesses.  
For example, under New York’s Criminal Procedure Law, 
section 60.35(1), a party may impeach its own witness only 
when (1) the testimony on direct pertains to a material issue of 
the case and tends to disprove the position of the party calling 
the witness; and (2) the witness has previously made a written 
and signed, or sworn, statement contradicting the testimony.29  
Under this rule, in the hypothetical case given at the beginning 
of this essay, if the victim were to be called to the stand by the 
people and were to deny that the incident occurred in the way 
she initially described, the prosecutor would not be able to 
impeach her with any oral statements made to the police, other 
than excited utterances.  The prosecutor would only be able to 
challenge her trial testimony if she had signed a written 
statement, had been deposed or had testified in the grand jury. 
And the New York rule is yet more restrictive.  If a New 
York prosecutor is able to impeach a victim using prior written 
and signed or sworn statements, the prior statements are 
admissible only to impeach the witness’ credibility, not as 
evidence in chief.30  This can lead to the improbable result of a 
case being dismissed for failure to present a legally sufficient 
case-in-chief, even though a prosecutor has proven, through 
effective cross-examination of a coerced, intimidated, or simply 
untruthful victim that the crime charged did occur.  Legislation 
abolishing these overly technical and restrictive rules would 
result in fairer trial outcomes, and would help to protect 
victims by holding offenders accountable. 
To go one step further, prosecutors may want to use 
Crawford as a starting point to advocate for more liberal 
hearsay exceptions.  Crawford restricts the use of prior 
testimonial statements made without an opportunity for the 
  
 29 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.35(1) (McKinney 2005). 
 30 Id. § 60.35(2). 
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defense to cross-examine.  Can this then mean that prior 
testimonial statements can be made admissible, without 
violating a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, if there is an 
opportunity to cross-examine?  If so, then perhaps prosecutors 
may be able to present such prior testimonial statements and 
then simply make the witness available for cross-examination.  
This could present an even greater opportunity for cases to be 
proven using the evidence initially gathered at the scene.  It 
also could be a means of restoring some of the newer statutory 
hearsay exceptions limited by Crawford.  But, of course, any 
efforts to employ this tactic would again have to be tempered 
by considered reflection of its eventual impact on victim safety. 
CONCLUSION 
The future of domestic violence prosecution will depend 
largely on how these various issues get decided.  Crawford has 
changed the playing field when it comes to efforts to prosecute 
domestic violence against non-cooperative victims, but not as 
much as some had predicted.  Some of the more far-reaching 
efforts over the last decade have been reined in.  But the more 
conservative efforts, which rely on evidence collection and 
traditional hearsay exceptions, have not suffered much at all.  
Crawford also presents opportunities to again think creatively.  
By focusing on proving forfeiture of the right of confrontation, 
or by promoting more opportunities for cross-examination, 
prosecutors of domestic violence may be able to use strategies 
developed in response to Crawford to hold offenders 
accountable, and, ultimately, to protect victims. 
